Author    Christian Novak

On page six of the Labour-NZ First coalition deal, under the innocuous heading ‘other’, is an agreement to work towards a free trade agreement (FTA) with Russia. Given Winston Peters’ previous criticism of the National Government over its suspension of an FTA with the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union, the move should hardly come as a surprise.

For Mr Peters, a past cabinet minister in both Labour and National-led governments, the policy continues his somewhat maverick brand of politics. In May last year he addressed the British House of Lords, imploring the UK public to be ‘bold’ and ditch the European Union (EU). And, following Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election, he labelled the result ‘a dramatic lesson’ for the political establishment.
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The most puzzling aspect of Peters’ plan for a Russia FTA, however, is its timing. New Zealand’s diplomats are currently working toward a lucrative free trade agreement with the EU, which happens to be a more significant trade partner than Russia. Although Prime Minister Jacinda Adern has come out publicly to say the EU deal—not the Russian FTA—is the priority, the announced policy is worth exploring because it breaks ranks with like-minded governments.

Author:       Robert Ayson

​At some point the previous government’s big money promise for defence equipment was going to run into political reality. But courtesy of the Ardern government’s arrival, it is happening faster than expected.
 
Treasurer Grant Robertson is asking all departments to ensure their spending plans are in line with the new government’s priorities. These obviously include initiatives in housing, education, health and child poverty. It’s not clear that military spending is anywhere near the top of the list. 

Author     B K Greener

A recent article by Victoria University’s Robert Ayson drew attention to the current weakening of US engagement in the region and China’s growing influence. In his piece Ayson raises a number of salient points. An emphasis on multilateralism and working with other countries to engage with both China and the USA is indeed key to New Zealand’s foreign policy. Yet he also suggests that “One of the unwritten rules of New Zealand’s recent foreign policy is that we can be comfortable with a rising China because the US has been there to reassure the region.” Ayson is not necessarily suggesting that the US is currently this reassuring presence (his piece smacks of some concern about the turbulence created by the current Trump administration), but it is still important to note the limitations of the idea that the US has always been a reassuring presence.

The US did ‘bolt the back door’ for New Zealand in World War Two, and a reliance on this relationship was cemented after the war by the signing of the ANZUS Treaty. The relationship remained strong until the effective suspension of New Zealand from ANZUS in the mid-1980s in punishment for its non-nuclear policy. It is this latter event which automatically highlights the contentious nature of any claim that the US has necessarily ‘reassured the region’. Tensions have arisen in the past and, despite a recent warming of relations between the two countries, conflicts are even more likely to arise with President Trump at the helm. Thus Steve Hoadley has pointed to “substantial policy differences over reliance on nuclear weapons, military assertiveness, economic protectionism, immigration restrictions and walls, and climate change denial, to name but a few”. Although administrations come and go, the consistent claim that New Zealand and the USA ‘share common values’ is already being worn thin by, for example, Washington’s reducing the emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy.