Author     Christine Bogle

Last week, Tongans were taken by surprise by a sudden proclamation from the king, Tupou VI, that, following consideration of advice from the Speaker, Parliament was dissolved immediately and commanding fresh elections be held on 16 November, a year ahead of schedule. The move underscored the complications involved in embedding the country’s new democracy.
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In 2010 Tonga made a historic switch to a more democratic system, following a process instigated by then King George Tupou V (who reigned 2006-2012). Under his predecessor, King Tupou IV, a pro-democracy movement had grown up, calling for political reform. An increasing tempo of protest had built up, culminating in the tragic riots of 16 November 2006, which occurred despite the new king’s having by then already declared his commitment to democratisation.

Author: Jo Sprat
New Zealand goes to the polls on 23 September, presenting a time of opportunity for policy renewal. What would a post-election agenda for New Zealand’s international development cooperation efforts look like? What is an appropriate response to the evolving global context, what New Zealanders want, and what we know works?
 
The current National-party led government’s core foreign policy priority is to boost New Zealand exports. While there are other foci, such as security and global rules, trade dominates New Zealand’s foreign policy. New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) is aligned with efforts to advertise, brand and sell New Zealand across the world. This approach undermines quality development cooperation efforts. We now have a mediocre Aid Programme, in a world where the challenges for global prosperity and peace demand more of New Zealand. 

Author    Robert Ayson

It’s no surprise that New Zealand strongly endorsed the UN Security Council’s latest sanctions against North Korea. One stone accounted for three birds. The first is Wellington’s concern that Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear program threatens regional stability and the prospects for nuclear disarmament. The second is that a response authorized by the Council is a big tick in the international legitimacy and rules-based system boxes. The third is that this response reflected US-China cooperation. That’s not only good for Wellington’s view of regional order, but also for hopes that President Trump may be thinking twice about setting off a trade war with China.
 
But as New Zealand’s diplomats will know, we have been here before. North Korea has already rejected the new measures and is unlikely to show much sign of slowing its missile and nuclear programs. China may have approved the additional sanctions. And its Foreign Minister criticized North Korea on the sidelines of a recent ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Manila. But few expect Beijing to place maximum pressure on its wayward ally: for all its faults, North Korea remains a buffer state for China. And even if Beijing did maximize the economic pressure, few would expect Pyongyang to suddenly stop in its proliferation tracks. Barring regime collapse, the world will be dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs for some time to come.