Author   Peter Greener

​In March 2022, the Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the 2020/21 Annual Review of the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF, noted in the section headed ‘Strategic competition in the Pacific’ that, “We heard that there will not be a white paper in 2022. However, Defence will be recommending to Ministers terms of reference that look at the development of defence policy settings in a more proactive approach, and the force structure that would support those settings.” Does this mean that there might be a new white paper in 2023, will we see another government defence policy statement, or will there be a revised defence capability plan?
 
The Ministry of Defence website notes that Defence policy settings in New Zealand's are reviewed on a regular basis, and that “The results of these reviews, Defence White Papers and Strategic Defence Policy Statements, are the highest-level expression of Government's Defence policy settings.” It notes that, “these policy documents will present an assessment of New Zealand's strategic environment and set out at a high level the range of activities the New Zealand Defence Force must be prepared to undertake” before adding that “[t]he most recent formal expression of New Zealand's Defence policy is the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018,” which was released by the Labour-led Coalition Government.

Author  Robert Ayson

​In little more than a year an inside-out experiment at foreign policy making for New Zealand has been turned outside-in. Barely fifteen months ago Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta set out an agenda which began with the Treaty of Waitangi and sought to globalise indigenous values. But claims to New Zealand’s foreign policy uniqueness have been overtaken by events in Europe. Since Russia launched its devastating invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, Jacinda Ardern’s government has been focused on expressing New Zealand’s solidarity with its larger western partners.
 
While more a follower than a leader New Zealand has nonetheless crossed two important policy thresholds in trying to keep pace with its traditional partners as they punish Moscow. First, the Ardern government eventually relented to pressure and introduced Russia-specific autonomous sanctions legislation. Second, despite its initial reluctance to provide military assistance, the Labour-led government also decided that New Zealand would help fund the United Kingdom’s provision of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine’s armed forces.