Author: Jana von Stein

It is often held that New Zealand punches ‘above its weight’ in many a competition, whether it’s good or bad to be the winner. Assertions bringing this cliché to mind are not difficult to locate. Whether in the context of sporting achievements or important strategic partnerships, we often hear that New Zealand is one of the best pound-for-pound punchers around.

This is just as well, because in the international political arena, weight class is hardly to this country’s advantage. New Zealand, like other small countries, has a very limited ability to affect global politics through the use of its resources alone. Small countries the world over usually understand this reality. Some choose to look inward, keeping international engagement to a minimum. Some make themselves champions of regional cooperation. And some attempt to stand out by cultivating a reputation for doing more than their fair share of ‘do-gooder politics’: contributing to international efforts that have a moral or ethical flavour to them.

Author: Jon Fraenkel

The royal family may be fêted on their visits to New Zealand and Australia or the Pacific Islands, but do they have any meaningful role in the region? A conference held at the New Zealand parliament on 22nd May looked at ‘Constitutional Monarchy in the Commonwealth Realms: Opportunities in Common’. The idea of ‘opportunities in common’ suggested scope for enhanced connections between the monarchy and the Pacific realms, including New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands.

Yet even as regards the United Kingdom, those seeking such ‘opportunities in common’ are likely to be frustrated. The recent release of the so-called ‘Black Spider’ letters of 2004-5 exposed Prince Charles lobbying the British government on matters such as alternative herbal medicines and the need for ministers to prioritize action against the illegal fishing of the Patagonian toothfish. In 2004-5, Britain’s elected politicians, including Tony Blair, were not simply ready to listen to, but to welcome and encourage, the Prince’s hectoring counsels. The British government subsequently tightened the Freedom of Information Act (via the 2010 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act) so as to provide ‘absolute exemption’ on requests relating to government communications with the throne. So, if there be ‘opportunities in common’ sought by the Queen or her heirs, these will largely be explored behind closed doors, and not subject to deliberation at conferences like that on 22nd May in New Zealand’s parliament.    

Author: Xiaoming Huang

Not many people reading the continuing coverage of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will find New Zealand’s name mentioned in media commentary. A piece in the South China Morning Post is just the latest to mention that the prospective members include ‘staunch US allies in Europe such as Britain, Germany, France and Italy.’ This is a clear play into the US-China geopolitical analysis, which was widely covered once the UK announced its intention to join. The now infamous warning from a US official that “We are wary about a trend toward constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power” shows an intent by Washington to frame the issue as part of a series of US-China struggles for influence.

In a quiet fashion, New Zealand got its own accommodation of China much earlier. On the 5th of January, New Zealand became the AIIB’s 24th Prospective Founding Member, and the first developed Western nation to sign up. There are now 57 such prospective members. By comparison, the Asian Development Bank had just 31 members when it was set up in 1966.

Author: Matthew Hill

Amidst the fluster regarding the rise of the so-called Islamic State, observers would be forgiven for thinking that Middle East instability and transnational Islamic radicalisation represent the most daunting threats to New Zealand’s national security interests. Yet, as production of the 2015 Defence White Paper gets underway, it is worth acknowledging the substantial challenges that have emerged in the international security environment of our own region over the past five years. Such reflection is sobering.

As the Ministry of Defence’s own 2014 Defence Assessment notes, the military rise of China has continued apace. Commensurate with its surging economic weight, the PRC is rapidly closing the gap in military spending with the United States. Yet more significant than this quantitative shift is the qualitative change in Beijing’s strategic behavior, characterized by greater assertiveness and a concerning willingness to risk confrontation vis-à-vis its neighbors. This is backed up with an increasingly sophisticated anti-access/area denial force structure that has weakened Washington’s capacity to unilaterally regulate crisis dynamics.