Authors     Benedict Xu-Holland and Harry Berger

​When Trade Minister David Parker signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in Chile on 8 March it came just a few weeks after the Labour-led coalition government released a National Impact Assessment of the deal. In a series of interviews Parker argued that Labour was signing TPP-11 for pragmatic reasons (he gave the agreement a ‘7 out of 10’). Walking away from the deal, he said, would mean New Zealand would suffer a net-loss from a decline in investment and trade opportunities. The evidence Parker cited was largely based on the country's prior preferential trade agreements (PTAs). For example, he said the 2008 New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement (NZCFTA) was the reason for the huge increase in trade and investment between the two countries in the last decade. ​

​But how persuasive are Mr. Parker’s claims? Without detailed post-hoc modelling it is near impossible to credibly infer causality between New Zealand's PTAs and aggregate trade growth. A host of variables may be responsible, from changing migration patterns to a shift to consumption-based growth. Australia, which only signed a PTA with China in late 2015, saw its own trade quadruple during the previous decade. In light of this, can New Zealand credibly attribute our success to the NZCFTA? And what does this mean for claims made about the CPTPP?

Author      Joanna Spratt 

Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters’ recent ‘Shifting the Dial’ speech brought some welcome clarity to the new government’s foreign policy, complementing Prime Minister Ardern’s first foreign policy speech of a few days earlier. Delivered in Sydney, Peters’ speech focused on New Zealand’s neighbourhood: Australia and Pacific Island Countries. What did the speech signal for New Zealand’s development cooperation efforts under the Ardern government?
 
The most interesting part of the Minster’s speech was the ‘shift of the dial’ in working with the Pacific. New principles now underpin New Zealand’s “shared destiny” with Pacific Island Countries: understanding, friendship, mutual benefit, collective ambition, and sustainable results. Underpinning these principles is the assertion that New Zealand has a common identity with the Pacific, and therefore similar interests. This is the analysis that led to the integration, about a year ago, of MFAT’s Pacific Division and the Pacific Aid Programme. The Minister’s speech is a clear articulation of what this integration can mean in diplomatic terms.
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Author    Jon Fraenkel

During a whistle-stop tour of Samoa, Tonga, Niue and the Cook Islands, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has promised a ‘reset’ of Pacific policy. She says her government can and will do better in the region. Speaking at the Lowy Institute in Australia on March 1st, Foreign Minister Winston Peters stressed the need to ‘shift the dial’ on New Zealand’s Pacific policy. But beyond a few new projects to build roads, provide cyclone relief, and assist small businesses, and a sensible revision to rules about portability of pensions, what is really likely to change as regards New Zealand’s Pacific policy?
 
Much of Mr Peters’ Lowy Institute speech offered the familiar warm words about New Zealand’s distinctive Pacific identity, but he also indicated considerable ‘anxiety’ about China’s presence in the region. Bearing hallmarks of continuity rather than change, Mr Peters echoed the focus of his predecessor on ‘sustainable economic development’. That prioritization has been contested by some critics of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray McCully’s aid policy, who prefer instead a focus on poverty alleviation and social welfare.   

Author     David Capie

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern gave us the clearest sense yet of the direction New Zealand’s coalition government will take in foreign policy in a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in Wellington this week. 
 
Any Prime Minister’s first big foreign policy speech attracts interest, but given Ardern sits at the head of an ideologically diverse three-party government, her address drew closer scrutiny than most. The Prime Minister faced the dual challenge of laying out a fresh new foreign policy vision while juggling the diverse interests of her New Zealand First and Green Party partners.
 
In this, the speech was largely successful.