Author    Mary Wareham

In welcome news, the Aotearoa New Zealand government has announced it will push for the adoption of new international law to prohibit and limit autonomous weapons systems. The policy commits New Zealand to play “a leadership role in building an inclusive coalition of states, experts and civil society” to achieve this goal. 

According to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Phil Twyford, the prospect of delegating the decision to take human life to machines is “abhorrent and inconsistent with New Zealand’s interests and values.” Indeed, killing or injuring people based on data collected by sensors and processed by machines would violate human dignity. My organization, Human Rights Watch, and other members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots are concerned that relying on algorithms to target people will dehumanize warfare and erode our collective humanity.

Author   Anna Powles 

On November 4, Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta gave her first major foreign policy speech on Aotearoa New Zealand’s policy in the Pacific. It was highly anticipated amongst Pacific watchers. Mahuta had signalled at the outset of her term that she intended to deliver a foreign policy distinct from that of her predecessor Winston Peters. At its core is New Zealand’s policy transition from the Pacific Reset, launched by Peters in 2018, to a Pacific Resilience partnership approach announced by Mahuta and laid out in a subsequently released Cabinet paper. Last Friday, the 'Partnering for Resilience' approach received its first international mention at the Australia-Aotearoa New Zealand Foreign Minister Consultations.
 
Since Mahuta was appointed foreign minister in late 2020, she has given a number of speeches that have sought to define her foreign policy agenda and approach. It is helpful to consider this latest speech in the context of earlier statements, notably Mahuta’s inaugural foreign policy speech at Waitangi, her dragon and the taniwha speech to the New Zealand China Council, and her address to the Otago Foreign Policy School. The common theme is the centrality of Te Tiriti o Waitangi to New Zealand’s foreign policy principles and praxis; and that New Zealand’s approach to the Pacific is anchored in New Zealand’s connections to Polynesia.​

Author   Robert Ayson

​It takes a lot for me to get focused on questions of methodology. But my interest was piqued by this week’s media coverage of the Ministry of Defence’s thinking as it prepares a new Defence Assessment (normally the part way mark towards a new Defence White Paper). It  wasn’t surprising to know that with the increased regional competition between China and the US, among other factors, defence officials judge that New Zealand’s security environment is deteriorating. As David Capie has suggested, that point should hardly be news to anyone. Instead my attention was drawn to another quote from the video (which I have not seen, and that has since been removed from public view): “New Zealand’s defence policy approach should shift from a predominantly reactive risk management-centred approach to one based on a more deliberate and proactive strategy, with explicitly prioritised policy objectives.”
 
Combining that methodological point together with a less positive security environment can be crudely translated as follows: New Zealand’s defence policy will be less about managing a wide range of risks and more focused on efforts to forestall, deter or defeat, specific threats. You might think I am rushing to an outlandish summation out of sync with the way New Zealand thinks about the options available to it. But other parts of the official system are thinking this way too. A few days ago, Andrew Little, argued in an address hosted by the Centre for Strategic Studies that there were “four premises” for a much needed “conversation on national security.” The first of these deserves careful consideration: “New Zealand faces threats to physical and economic security, and social institutions from forces and interests that would do us harm.”

Author  David Andrews

For the first time since the Anzac-class frigate program commenced in the 1980s, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) are simultaneously undertaking a comprehensive fleet recapitalisation. By the mid-2030s, the RNZN and RAN are both due to replace their current surface warfare, patrol, sealift, hydrographic, and mine countermeasures vessels. This presents a unique opportunity to reinvigorate and strengthen the trans-Tasman relationship by pursuing a coordinated and consolidated approach to maritime capability acquisition that would enhance interoperability and reinforce a sense of shared purpose and direction between the allies.
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As Peter Greener noted recently, despite the ongoing social and economic challenges posed by COVID-19, this is a crucial time in setting out the shape of the future New Zealand fleet. As I have argued previously, in this global context, defence organisations everywhere can expect to come under pressure to find savings, which will necessitate some hard (or perhaps, creative) choices to ensure they are able to adequately respond to the full range of emergent security challenges.

Author  Peter Greener

At a time when the economy continues to face the costs imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic it may seem premature to be exploring opportunities for building the Royal New Zealand Navy of the future, but now is the very time to be doing so.
 
Over the next ten to fifteen years, the government will need to consider replacements for the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Anzac frigates and the dive and hydrographic support ship HMNZS Manawanui. The Defence Capability Plan 2019 envisaged a decision being made by 2028 for the replacement of the Offshore Patrol Vessels, with the Anzac frigates being replaced in the 2030s “with modern surface combatants relevant to New Zealand’s prevailing strategic environment”.  The dive and hydrographic capability was to see HMNZS Manawanui “replaced with a similar vessel in the mid-2030s”.

Author  B K Greener

The Taliban have achieved in hours what many would thought would take them at least months. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have folded like a house of cards. Kabul has fallen, and many provincial capitals too. And despite earlier protestations to the contrary, the Taliban is not looking to share power. After twenty years of international intervention, the loss of tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars of aid, many of the gains made have been rolled back in the blink of an eye.
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Analyses of what went wrong will continue to emerge. Those who warned of the perils of history – regurgitating phrases like ‘graveyard of empires’ – or who raised concerns about flimsiness of the ANSF or who shook their heads about the ill-conceived nature of liberal state-building attempts may crow, but if they do, it should be without any pleasure. For what comes now?

Author    David Capie

Over the last few months more than a few commentators at home and abroad have become highly sensitive to changes in the New Zealand government’s China settings. Statements about everything from Hong Kong, cyber-security, the origins of covid-19, and the treatment of the Uighurs have been subjected to forensic scrutiny. Yet last week, perhaps lost amidst a late deluge of Olympic medals, a significant development in New Zealand’s position on China’s claims in the South China Sea went largely unnoticed.
 
By submitting a statement or ‘note verbale’ to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, New Zealand has joined a growing number of countries including Australia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, the UK, the US, and Vietnam, setting out their legal position on the South China Sea disputes. In doing so, the Ardern government has gone much further than it has previously been willing to go in rejecting Beijing’s expansive territorial claims.

Author   David Capie

​Last week’s speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern offered the clearest statement yet of how her Labour government wants to manage the challenges of a more contested region.
 
The immediate headlines were all about the Prime Minister’s use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, a shift away from New Zealand’s longstanding desire to see itself as at home in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region, not least as host of APEC this year. Because ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ is a framework promoted enthusiastically in Washington and elsewhere, Ardern’s choice of language prompted some to claim the PM “has firmly aligned New Zealand with the United States worldview”. But a closer look at the speech suggests Ardern’s government wants to embrace Indo-Pacific on its own terms.

Author  Marion Crawshaw

Development assistance underpins New Zealand’s Pacific engagements. But COVID is changing its focus. The long term is murky and challenging but it’s worth asking some hard questions.

Looking forward New Zealand’s aid budget is similar to previous years (see here). Country allocations are set out here. But details of expenditure are opaque. Some projects are continuing, but closed borders and shattered economies create problems for existing long term development projects, especially those that rely on overseas experts travelling to work with local counterparts.  Zoom helps with programme consultation and support but it can’t substitute for in-person contacts.  Broadband internet connections in the Pacific are slow and very expensive.

In addition, Pacific countries have experienced a COVID-induced drop in government revenues, especially those heavily dependent on tourism for government income and livelihoods.  These include Fiji, Cook Islands and Samoa.  COVID has exacerbated PNG‘s fiscal issues. New Zealand provided an initial NZ$50 million package of support to prepare health systems, and address wider health, economic, governance and social challenges arising from the pandemic.  Ongoing funding has helped to ensure supplies of medicines, food, PPE and vaccines, especially for those Pacific counties experiencing COVID outbreaks. The need is enormous and will be protracted. An independent Pacific focused organisation providing analysis, visibility and advocacy for New Zealand’s Pacific relationships and supporting policy development would help us move forward.

Author     Anna Powles

The political crisis  in Samoa is heading into its eighth week. The caretaker prime minister, Tuila'epa Aiono Sa'ilele Malielegaoi, leader of the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), who has held power for 22 years, shows little inclination to end the impasse and allow prime minister-elect Fiame Naomi Mata’afa and the Faʻatuatua i le Atua Samoa ua Tasi (F.A.S.T) party to form government.
 
On the eve of the 59th independence anniversary on June 1st, the Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Alapati Lui Mata’eliga, used his Monday mass to castigate Tuilaepa, seated in the front pew, suggesting the  current caretaker government is heading towards a dictatorship and that “the heart of any democratic government is the constitution and the rule of law”.  Invoking the legacy of the Mau movement, the Archbishop decried the state of the nation: “there is no peace…it appears as if our forefather’s shed blood for no reason.”