Author      Robert Ayson

Jim Rolfe’s vision for a New Zealand National Security Strategy has two main requirements. One is a comprehensive perspective – inclusive of international and domestic security challenges, inclusive of the many agencies that are part of an expanding national security community, and inclusive of the many building blocks which are already out there in existing documentation. The other is what Jim calls “overall coherence”. It’s the job of the national security strategy to connect the dots, providing guidance to agencies as they work together. An NSS for New Zealand would provide the big picture, the meta-narrative, for this collaborative effort.

But comprehensiveness and coherence can be unhappy bedfellows, as any grader of university essays will tell you. And on the basis of path dependency and sunken bureaucratic costs, I’d say that comprehensiveness begins as the early favourite. New Zealand’s existing National Security System takes an “all risks” approach to security. And the list of hazards on the 22nd and 23rd pages of the 2016 National Security System Handbook is anything but parsimonious: droughts, food safety issues, infectious human diseases, animal diseases, wild fires, marine oil spills, infrastructure failure, cyber incidents, terrorism, espionage, several varieties of meteorological hazard, and more (including, one might presume, war itself).

Author      Jim Rolfe

New Zealand is the only Five Eyes partner without an explicit national security strategy document (although technically Canada calls their version a national security policy). Clearly our closest partners believe that some form of overarching direction is useful for determining the activities of individual agencies.

Of course, a New Zealand strategy can be determined through examination of past statements and actions. But that is hindsight. What would be more useful would be some foresight in a form that brings together all the strands of the country’s strategic activities and lays out a sense, in one document, where we are going and where, in the future, resources to achieve national security goals should be directed. What should such a document encompass? 

Author     Robert Ayson

Since the Ardern government took office, we've been treated to a veritable deluge of publically launched defence policy documents. Minister Ron Mark has had no need of a new White Paper – the next one is due no earlier than 2021. But last year he launched something arguably just as significant in a Strategic Policy Statement which changed New Zealand's tune on China and paved the way for the purchase of the P8 maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft.
 
The government’s ambitious remit for the defence force has since been spelled out in a new Defence Capability Plan. There are now so many major projects (many exceeding $1billion) that one has to wonder about the breaking point for the purse-strings of future governments. And that’s not all for readers of defence policy pronouncements. Last year saw the first edition of a new series of Assessments explain how defence was taking climate change seriously, including in the Pacific. Jointly released by James Shaw, this was one way for Mr Mark to thank the Greens for their agreement to some of the above, including expensive aircraft good at finding submarines.

Author   Dorota Heidrich

Since 2014, the European Union (EU) has seen a steep rise in migrants (both economic and forced) crossing its external borders. Approximately 1.3 million and 1.2 million new asylum applications (mainly by Syrian nationals) were submitted in the EU in 2015 and 2016 (respectively). The numbers were almost twice as high as the previous peak of the early 1990s, triggered by the Balkan wars.
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However, the scale of this “crisis” is less apparent when the number of newcomers is set against the EU-28’s population of about 513 million. Moreover, out of over 1.2 million asylum applications lodged in 2016, fewer than 300,000 individuals were granted protection (refugee status or other). Why then have migration flows since 2014 been dubbed a “crisis”? And what was the “crisis” about? 

Author     Euan Graham

​Rob Ayson’s thought-provoking post implied that the temporary incapacity of New Zealand’s two ANZAC frigates is a blessing in disguise. In other words, because both vessels were undergoing a significant upgrade refit in Canada, Wellington would be able to rebuff any request from Washington to send a warship to the Gulf, simply because the capability was unavailable. Rob went on to ponder whether the absence of a surface combat capability beyond 2030 really matters for keeping New Zealand’s lights on.
 
To this Australia-based occasional commentator on trans-Tasman strategic affairs that seems like a fair, if deliberately provocative, question. After all, successive New Zealand governments have run down the NZDF’s combat capabilities, including its fast jets, without incurring obvious strategic costs. Or, at least not costs that bother most taxpayers, since it is they who are ultimately expected to foot the bill for defence, against competing priorities with more tangible socio-economic benefits. 
  

Author    Robert Ayson

One day (well, 20 May of this year to be precise) as Opposition Leader you’re launching a discussion document on your party’s international policies. ‘National's positioning on international relations issues is anchored in our values, ’ you say. ‘Those values are rooted in our country's long history of unbroken democracy, embrace of political and economic freedoms, tolerance, a staunch defence of fundamental human rights, and a recognition of the need to provide security and safety to our people at home and abroad.’ Hear, hear. But barely 100 days later and you give an interview in China where you laud Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China, doing your level best to prove the thesis that the only value that really matters is trade-enabled prosperity.

​This is the recent course that New Zealand’s National Party leader Simon Bridges has taken, and it’s no surprise that he is getting roasted for his interview performance. He’s easy meat for the Ardern government which has toughened up New Zealand’s stance on China since coming into office, laying out New Zealand’s concerns about Beijing’s South China Sea moves in last year’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement and more recently including New Zealand’s signature on a letter to the UN Human Rights Council about China’s detention practices in Xinjiang. Finance Minister Grant Robertson, a keen rugby player, took the ball and ran: “the most extraordinary interview I think I've ever seen the leader of a National Party give", he is reported to have said in parliament. 

Author      Lance Beath

Professor Robert Ayson is right to be uncertain about the likely shape of the future surface combatant force once HMNZS Te Kaha and Te Mana are withdrawn from service in the first half of the 2030s. But the reasons for uncertainty are a good deal more complex than Rob’s piece argues.

Robert writes ‘If I was Navy, and fond of my frigates, I’d regard with dread paragraph 204 of the DCP (government’s Defence Capability Plan of April 2019): “The ANZAC Frigates are scheduled to be replaced with modern surface combatants relevant to New Zealand’s prevailing strategic environment in the mid-2030s.” This is hardly a definitive commitment.’ 
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It is hard to see why anyone thinking about the question of the replacement of the frigates would be unhappy with this drafting. The DCP says as much as needs to be said, or indeed can sensibly be said, this far out from any replacement decision, viz: the ANZAC frigates are scheduled to be replaced with modern surface combatants relevant to the strategic environment of the mid-2030s and well beyond.

Author    Robert Ayson

​As I read Jim Rolfe’s thoughtful response to my post on the future of New Zealand’s frigates, one line really stood out. “The primary purpose of the warships is to be able to go into dangerous situations and defeat or deter enemies at sea.” This important message is only amplified if we see what the government’s recent Defence Capability Plan (DCP) says about the money that is being spent on Te Kaha and Te Mana: “These upgrades have been undertaken to ensure that the frigates remain world-class maritime combat capabilities for the full duration of their service.”
 
And that brings to mind Lance Beath’s polite reinterpretation of my subversive suggestion: “if New Zealand did not need the kind of naval combat capability represented by our two upgraded frigates”, he asks, “why did this government choose to spend many hundreds of millions of dollars on the Frigate Systems Upgrade in the first place?” Why indeed. 

Author    Jim Rolfe

Two of my colleagues have used this forum recently to comment on the need for a naval combat force. Both have useful insights to make, but neither gets to the root of the issue.

Professor Robert Ayson assumes that because we do not have ships readily available today because they are being upgraded (and we seem to be surviving as a country without them) a future government may well decide that the cost of a warship capability might better be directed elsewhere. Perhaps so, but this seems to me to be hypothetical and drawing from a single data point.
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In contrast, Lance Beath argues that a naval combatant capability is essential, but that the real answer lies in an integrated single combat service for the armed forces. That is, however, to discuss structure rather than capability and to assume the context of the domains within which future operations will be conducted. 

Author    Lance Beath

In a recent Incline post titled ‘Where are the Frigates?’ Professor Robert Ayson notes, quite correctly, that the frigates currently undergoing refit in Canada represent ‘no small portion of New Zealand’s modest capacity to project military power.’ He then asks, ‘if New Zealand can have a period of months when it does without that capacity in its entirety, would the lights really go out if there were no frigates at all?’
 
A headline writer on Newsroom, in republishing Rob’s piece, added the provocative headline ‘Farewell to New Zealand’s Frigates?’ with a lead-in paragraph saying that ‘New Zealand’s inability to contribute naval frigates to a US-led operation near Iran may seem embarrassing – but as Robert Ayson writes, it may actually demonstrate we don’t need the vessels at all.’
 
Yet, as I read Rob’s piece, he seemed to me to be asking a rhetorical question. The current unavailability of the two major components of the Navy’s surface combat force does not demonstrate lack of necessity. More correctly, what it demonstrates is a larger and more pressing phenomenon that was the subject of an earlier Incline post by Van Jackson. Namely, an inability to do what the NZDF might be asked to do because of ongoing resource shortfalls or what Jackson called the ‘strategy-force mismatch’.