Author    Christian Novak

On page six of the Labour-NZ First coalition deal, under the innocuous heading ‘other’, is an agreement to work towards a free trade agreement (FTA) with Russia. Given Winston Peters’ previous criticism of the National Government over its suspension of an FTA with the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union, the move should hardly come as a surprise.

For Mr Peters, a past cabinet minister in both Labour and National-led governments, the policy continues his somewhat maverick brand of politics. In May last year he addressed the British House of Lords, imploring the UK public to be ‘bold’ and ditch the European Union (EU). And, following Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election, he labelled the result ‘a dramatic lesson’ for the political establishment.
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The most puzzling aspect of Peters’ plan for a Russia FTA, however, is its timing. New Zealand’s diplomats are currently working toward a lucrative free trade agreement with the EU, which happens to be a more significant trade partner than Russia. Although Prime Minister Jacinda Adern has come out publicly to say the EU deal—not the Russian FTA—is the priority, the announced policy is worth exploring because it breaks ranks with like-minded governments.

Author:       Robert Ayson

​At some point the previous government’s big money promise for defence equipment was going to run into political reality. But courtesy of the Ardern government’s arrival, it is happening faster than expected.
 
Treasurer Grant Robertson is asking all departments to ensure their spending plans are in line with the new government’s priorities. These obviously include initiatives in housing, education, health and child poverty. It’s not clear that military spending is anywhere near the top of the list. 

Author     B K Greener

A recent article by Victoria University’s Robert Ayson drew attention to the current weakening of US engagement in the region and China’s growing influence. In his piece Ayson raises a number of salient points. An emphasis on multilateralism and working with other countries to engage with both China and the USA is indeed key to New Zealand’s foreign policy. Yet he also suggests that “One of the unwritten rules of New Zealand’s recent foreign policy is that we can be comfortable with a rising China because the US has been there to reassure the region.” Ayson is not necessarily suggesting that the US is currently this reassuring presence (his piece smacks of some concern about the turbulence created by the current Trump administration), but it is still important to note the limitations of the idea that the US has always been a reassuring presence.

The US did ‘bolt the back door’ for New Zealand in World War Two, and a reliance on this relationship was cemented after the war by the signing of the ANZUS Treaty. The relationship remained strong until the effective suspension of New Zealand from ANZUS in the mid-1980s in punishment for its non-nuclear policy. It is this latter event which automatically highlights the contentious nature of any claim that the US has necessarily ‘reassured the region’. Tensions have arisen in the past and, despite a recent warming of relations between the two countries, conflicts are even more likely to arise with President Trump at the helm. Thus Steve Hoadley has pointed to “substantial policy differences over reliance on nuclear weapons, military assertiveness, economic protectionism, immigration restrictions and walls, and climate change denial, to name but a few”. Although administrations come and go, the consistent claim that New Zealand and the USA ‘share common values’ is already being worn thin by, for example, Washington’s reducing the emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy.

Author  Robert Ayson

You might not have thought so from the campaign, but whichever coalition government is formed once Winston Peters has studied the Special Votes will have a busy external agenda. The Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet will probably get some of the same messages which Gerry Brownlee received in April. ‘New Zealand’s external environment is increasingly turbulent’, read the advice prepared by MFAT, ‘with the risks for small countries particularly acute.’
 
It’s routine for governments to claim that they is operating in uncertain environments. But this time things are genuinely troubling. And one area for New Zealand to watch is the increasingly tricky intersections between our economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific. For the last few months, a group of us at Victoria University have been looking at this issue. And as I’ve suggested in a new report, published by the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, smaller powers in the Asia-Pacific are vulnerable as China and the United States use economic pressure to advance their security agendas.

Author     Christine Bogle

Last week, Tongans were taken by surprise by a sudden proclamation from the king, Tupou VI, that, following consideration of advice from the Speaker, Parliament was dissolved immediately and commanding fresh elections be held on 16 November, a year ahead of schedule. The move underscored the complications involved in embedding the country’s new democracy.
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In 2010 Tonga made a historic switch to a more democratic system, following a process instigated by then King George Tupou V (who reigned 2006-2012). Under his predecessor, King Tupou IV, a pro-democracy movement had grown up, calling for political reform. An increasing tempo of protest had built up, culminating in the tragic riots of 16 November 2006, which occurred despite the new king’s having by then already declared his commitment to democratisation.

Author: Jo Sprat
New Zealand goes to the polls on 23 September, presenting a time of opportunity for policy renewal. What would a post-election agenda for New Zealand’s international development cooperation efforts look like? What is an appropriate response to the evolving global context, what New Zealanders want, and what we know works?
 
The current National-party led government’s core foreign policy priority is to boost New Zealand exports. While there are other foci, such as security and global rules, trade dominates New Zealand’s foreign policy. New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) is aligned with efforts to advertise, brand and sell New Zealand across the world. This approach undermines quality development cooperation efforts. We now have a mediocre Aid Programme, in a world where the challenges for global prosperity and peace demand more of New Zealand. 

Author    Robert Ayson

It’s no surprise that New Zealand strongly endorsed the UN Security Council’s latest sanctions against North Korea. One stone accounted for three birds. The first is Wellington’s concern that Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear program threatens regional stability and the prospects for nuclear disarmament. The second is that a response authorized by the Council is a big tick in the international legitimacy and rules-based system boxes. The third is that this response reflected US-China cooperation. That’s not only good for Wellington’s view of regional order, but also for hopes that President Trump may be thinking twice about setting off a trade war with China.
 
But as New Zealand’s diplomats will know, we have been here before. North Korea has already rejected the new measures and is unlikely to show much sign of slowing its missile and nuclear programs. China may have approved the additional sanctions. And its Foreign Minister criticized North Korea on the sidelines of a recent ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Manila. But few expect Beijing to place maximum pressure on its wayward ally: for all its faults, North Korea remains a buffer state for China. And even if Beijing did maximize the economic pressure, few would expect Pyongyang to suddenly stop in its proliferation tracks. Barring regime collapse, the world will be dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs for some time to come.

Author    Charles Finny

​Last week I attended an excellent symposium at Victoria University of Wellington on the likely relationship between Donald Trump’s United States and Xi Jinping’s China and what evolving Sino-US ties might mean for the wider region, including Australia and New Zealand.
 
The keynote speaker was the former head of the Singaporean Foreign Service, Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan. His comments were most contentious on the US-China-DPRK issue.

In summary, Ambassador Kausikan said that China can’t put sufficient pressure on North Korea to stop its nuclear and missile programmes as this will cause the regime to collapse and this will in turn put the focus on China’s own regime.  The US can’t attack the DPRK militarily as the consequences for South Korea and Japan would be devastating (including potentially millions dead).  He also doubted that attempts to negotiate a peace treaty with the DPRK would be successful.

Author       Terence Wood

Murray McCully's time as New Zealand's foreign minister is at an end. On 1 May he'll be replaced by Gerry Brownlee. It's hard to know what Mr. Brownlee will mean for New Zealand's approach to foreign aid, but it's easy to assess Mr. McCully's legacy. He brought change, and he claims to have brought development when before there was only pseudo-expertise and waste. But the changes he made were either unneeded or harmful, and the development achievements he claims either haven't occurred or can't be attributed to him.
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McCully will be remembered for reintegrating New Zealand's semi-autonomous aid agency into the foreign ministry for no good reason. But the smaller injuries he inflicted on New Zealand aid were every bit as important. He took a well-functioning humanitarian emergency fund for NGOs and replaced it with one that was only able to get money out the door when stories of its dysfunction made it into the media. He killed off a similarly efficient fund for non-emergency NGO work. McCully's botched humanitarian emergency fund was eventually repaired. But, as the latest OECD review pointed out, New Zealand still wants for an effective general NGO funding tool.

Author     Robert Ayson

​We don’t have a lot to go on to evaluate New Zealand’s response so far to the heightened state of tension between North Korea and the United States. Pretty much the only direct evidence comes from the first two minutes of a radio interview given by Bill English earlier this week.
 
But the Prime Minister said enough for us to detect an approach that seems consistent with New Zealand’s existing line on North Korea’s troubling nuclear program. Perhaps the most obvious and important of these is that New Zealand would like to see this problem dealt with peacefully through diplomatic channels and in accordance with United Nations resolutions. A second is that North Korea is violating its international legal obligations, a point that echoes Foreign Minister McCully’s condemnation last month of North Korean missile testing. A third is that New Zealand welcomes signs of US-China collaboration, including indications that China is willing to increase economic pressure on North Korea.